

IMPOSSIBILITY AND POSSIBILITY THEOREMS FOR SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS ON INCOMPLETE PREFERENCE PROFILES

KAZUTOSHI ANDO, MASAFUMI TSURUTANI, MASASHI UMEZAWA AND YOSHITSUGU
YAMAMOTO

References

- [1] K. Ando, A. Ohara and Y. Yamamoto, Impossibility theorems on mutual evaluation, *Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan* 46 (2003) 523–532 (in Japanese).
- [2] A. Gibbard, Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result, *Econometrica* 41 (1973) 587–601.
- [3] K. Ohbo, M. Tsurutani, M. Umezawa and Y. Yamamoto, Social welfare function for restricted individual preference domain, *Pacific J. Optim.* 1 (2005) 315–325.
- [4] M.A. Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedure and social welfare functions, *J. Economic Theory* 10 (1975) 187–217.

Manuscript received 28 October 2005
revised 8 August 2006
accepted for publication 27 October 2006

KAZUTOSHI ANDO
Department of Systems Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Shizuoka University,
Hamamatsu, 432-8561 Shizuoka, Japan
E-mail address: ando@sys.eng.shizuoka.ac.jp

MASAFUMI TSURUTANI
Daiwa Institute of Research Ltd. Daiwa-Eitai Bldg., 1-14-6 Eitai, 135-8461 Tokyo, Japan
E-mail address: masafumi.tsurutani@dir.co.jp

MASASHI UMEZAWA
Faculty of Business Administration, Daito Bunka University,
1-9-1 Takashima-daira, Tokyo 175-8571, Japan
E-mail address: momezawa@ic.daito.ac.jp

YOSHITSUGU YAMAMOTO
Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering, University of Tsukuba,
Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8573, Japan
E-mail address: yamamoto@sk.tsukuba.ac.jp

Copyright ©2007 Yokohama Publishers