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| K. Ohbo, M. Tsurutani, M. Umezawa and Y. Yamamoto | ||||||
| Key words: | ||||||
| social welfare function, voting, impossibility theorem, mutual evaluation | ||||||
| Mathematices Subject Classification: 91B14, 91B08, 91B12 | ||||||
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| K. Ohbo, M. Tsurutani, M. Umezawa and Y. Yamamoto | ||||||
| Key words: | ||||||
| social welfare function, voting, impossibility theorem, mutual evaluation | ||||||
| Mathematices Subject Classification: 91B14, 91B08, 91B12 | ||||||
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| Abstract: | |||
| We consider the social preference ordering in a society where each individual's preference domain is restricted to a subset of the whole set of alternatives. We show that the social welfare function satisfying unrestricted domain property, independence of irrelevant alternatives and weak Pareto principle is always dictatorial when at least one individual is entitled to express his/her preference on the whole set of alternatives. | |||
| Social welfare function for restricted individual preference | |
| Special Issue in Honor of the 65th Birthday of Hiroshi Konno | |||
| Volume 1, Number 2, May 2005, pp. 315-325 | |||